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I. Introduction 
  Since the publication of Fogel and Engerman’s (1974a) Time on the Cross, 
economic historians have been actively debating the validity of one of their central 
propositions – that slaves were allowed, and encouraged, to maintain family ties because 
doing so enhanced the value of slaves to their owners.  Kotlikoff (1979, 1992) 
investigated the potential effect of family connections on the value of slaves sold in the 
New Orleans market at the time of their sale. If preserving family ties enhanced the value 
of slaves to their owners, as Fogel and Engerman posited, the value of slave family 
members sold together would be higher. Kotlikoff found that the value of mother-father-
child groups – a rare event in the data – was higher than the combined value of the 
members of the family if they were sold singly. However, other family combinations, 
including mother-child sales – by far the most common form of family sale – suffered 
large discounts when compared to the sales of identical family members sold separately.  
Fogel and Engerman (1992: p. 258) argued that this finding could reflect a scale 
discount associated with slave sales – by selling the slaves as a group rather than singly, 
the sum of transactions costs would be reduced, or equivalently, buyers would realize a 
scale discount.  If the discount outweighed the economic benefits associated with family 
ties, family members would sell at a discount rather than a premium. If that explanation 
were correct, it could be confirmed by empirical analysis of two questions: (1) Is there a 
scale discount for selling slaves irrespective of whether they are family members or not; 
and (2) Do slave groups of any particular size command higher market prices when the 
members of the group sold are family members (as opposed to unrelated group 
members)? To our knowledge, no one has investigated these questions empirically.   2
 A related issue is the need to consider the potential effect of selectivity bias in the 
slave sales process. Slaves who are sold are likely not to be a random sample of slaves in 
the population.
1 In addition, it is possible that slave family members sold together are 
selected for sale through a different process than slaves sold individually. If that were 
true, then the family discount observed in the sales of slave family groups might reflect 
differences in the selection process for sale of families compared to the selection process 
for the sale of individuals. If selectivity bias explains the family discount, then observed 
discounts may give a distorted measure of the underlying value (in the broader slave 
population) to masters of keeping slave families together.  
Independent of their owners’ economic interests, families would not exist without 
the active support and participation of the slaves themselves. The family served, among 
other things, as a form of long-term life insurance against the hardships of slavery.  
Unlike their supposedly paternalistic owners (who sold them in New Orleans), ailing and 
infirm slaves could expect care and support from other family members (Gutman, 1976).  
Owners may have benefited from this mutual dependency by selling family members 
together rather than singly. Most obviously, if one member of the group were weak or 
sick, that individual might be sold with another member of his family because the joint 
value of the two would be greater than their value if sold separately. This negative 
selection of family groups would produce a family discount, which is simply indicative of 
                                                 
1 The fact that so many slaves were sold without other family members has been viewed as an indication of 
selectivity in the sales process.  For example, Fogel and Engerman (1974b: p. 49) interpret the fact that 
most females aged 20 to 24 were sold without children as evidence of slave traders’ preferences for single 
slaves. In contrast, Michael Tadman (1989: p. 152) suggests that the paucity of mothers with children was 
caused by slave traders’ indifference to family status, which produced the wholesale destruction of slave 
families. Fogel and Engerman’s and Tadman’s opposing conclusions reflect different assumptions applied 
to the same data. By focusing on slave price data, under the assumption of profit maximization by slave 
traders, we conclude below that slave traders selectively and predictably made an effort to preserve some 
slave families.   3
the lower market price attached to the weak or sick member of the family group.  More 
generally, negative selectivity need not result from illness or below-average value of any 
member of a family group; as shown in Section 2, negative selectivity occurs whenever 
the value of preserving a family tie is decreasing in the market value of family members.     
Transport costs may affect the average value of slaves shipped in family groups 
versus the value of slaves shipped singly.  When a fixed transport cost is applied to two 
similar goods, the effect is to lower the relative price of the higher quality good (Alchian 
and Allen, 1969: pp. 78-79).  Because shipment of slaves was costly, the relative price of 
high-valued slaves was lower in New Orleans, and as a consequence, buyers preferred to 
purchase relatively more of them (Pritchett and Chamberlain, 1993).   Positive selection 
is likely to have its greatest effect on the attributes of children chosen for market – only 
the healthiest and most robust would justify the cost of shipment (Pritchett and 
Freudenberger, 1992).  In deciding whether to ship a family to New Orleans, a trader 
would consider the attributes of the entire family, not just those of the children.  It is 
possible that the children shipped with families were less rigorously selected than the 
children shipped singly.  In addition, it might have been cheaper to ship a child with a 
parent rather than by himself.  If that were true, then the selection produced by transport 
costs for the attributes of family members could be different from those of individuals.  
Legal restrictions could also have played a role in producing observed differences 
between family group members and stand-alone slaves. As we discuss in more detail 
below, children under the age of ten could not be sold alone unless they were orphans. If 
this Louisiana law was enforced, it may have reduced the real option value and the 
market price of children sold as part of family groups.   4
Finally, childcare costs are another conceivable source of family discounts. If the 
presence of young children in a family group imposes childcare costs that reduce the 
market value of other family members’ labor supply, that could explain family discounts. 
In this paper, we test these various explanations of group scale discounts, and 
family-ties premia or discounts, using prices for slaves sold in the New Orleans market 
from 1820 through 1860.  We distinguish sales of groups that include family and non-
family members, and family group sales of different types (those involving small 
children, and other sales), to investigate how family-ties premia or discounts vary with 
the structure of the family sold. We investigate all five of the potential explanations for 
differences in group prices relative to stand-alone prices: (1) economies of scale in selling 
slaves, (2) selectivity bias produced by the intrinsic value of family ties, (3) transport cost 
selectivity bias, (4) legal restrictions, and (5) childcare costs. Our results lend support to 
the view that selectivity bias produced by the intrinsic value of family ties explains group 
discounts, rather than economies of scale in selling, selectivity bias related to transport 
costs, or real option value loss due to legal restrictions.   
Our results from slave price regressions can be summarized in the following nine 
propositions: (1) There is no scale discount for group sales of slaves.  Discounts depend 
on group composition rather than group size.     
(2) There is no general family-ties premium (as hypothesized by Fogel and 
Engerman) for family group sales. Family group prices tend to be less than the sum of the 
predicted prices based on a stand-alone model of the value of each family member.  
In fact, (3) family groups sold at a large and statistically significant discount 
relative to the prices of comparable slaves sold in non-family groups. (4) Family group   5
discounts were especially large for some family groups, namely those containing large 
proportions of children under the age of 13, or family groups containing older individuals 
(over 50 years of age). (5) Family groups that included both parents and at least one child 
sold at reduced discounts compared to other family groups, although the small number of 
such observations limits the significance of this observed effect.   
(6) Groups that contained children that were not specifically identified as related 
to a mother in the group also sold at a discount (although that discount is smaller than the 
discount associated with the presence of children in family groups) – we believe that this 
finding reflects the likely presence of unidentified mother-child linkages in some groups. 
(7) Transport costs cannot account for the differences between stand-alone and 
group slave prices. Although we do find evidence in both the slave price regressions and 
other work reported below confirming the importance of transport costs in increasing the 
prices of slaves sold in distant markets, group discounts are not driven by transport costs; 
discounts are the same for imported slave groups and slaves groups of local origin.  
(8) Although we find evidence that the legal restriction banning the sale of 
children under the age of ten was enforced to some degree, that restriction cannot explain 
family discounts. There is no discernible difference between family group discounts 
depending on whether the child included in the group is below or above ten years of age. 
And the presence of adult family members is also associated with a substantial family 
group discount. 
(9) Family-tie discounts cannot be attributed to childcare costs of children in 
family groups, for three reasons. First, in theory, childcare costs should be priced in to 
stand-alone sales of children as well as family-affiliated group sales including children.    6
Second, discounts on children are as large for grown children as for toddlers.  Third, 
discounts on other categories of family members are large, too.  
We conclude from the observed patterns of discounts on slave group sales that 
selectivity bias produced by the intrinsic value of family ties in the market is the best 
explanation for family discounts. The patterns of discounts that we identify are unlikely 
to have been observed in the marketplace in the absence of severe selectivity bias. 
Because group discounts cannot be attributed to scale discounts, legal restrictions, 
transport costs, or childcare costs, it follows that in the absence of selectivity bias there 
would have been a hugely profitable arbitrage opportunity for slave sellers of family 
groups to divide their groups prior to sale to substantially increase the overall value of the 
sale. Stated differently, under the assumption of zero arbitrage profits, the fact that 
heavily discounted family group sales occurred provides evidence of selectivity bias. 
In the case of family groups involving parent-child relationships, one can gauge 
the potential importance of selectivity bias by examining additional data. We examine 
data from ship manifests on the heights of slave children during their transport for sale to 
the New Orleans slave market. We find that children whom we identify as being likely to 
be traveling to the slave market as members of family groups are substantially shorter (by 
roughly two inches) than children of the same age and sex that we identify as unlikely to 
be traveling as members of parent-child groups. We argue that the taller stature of 
children sold without parents provides further evidence that some form of selectivity by 
traders explains the family-ties discounts observed in the New Orleans slave market. 
Section 2 presents a simple heuristic model of how the intrinsic market value of 
family ties can give rise to observed family group discounts. Section 3 describes the data   7
and estimation method employed in the slave sales regressions. Section 4 reports our 
findings on group and family-tie discounts or premia. Section 5 reviews the data and 
estimation method for the analysis of children’s heights from the manifests of ships 
carrying slaves to be sold in New Orleans. Section 6 presents the results on height 
differences for children with and without inferred family ties. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Modeling “Negative” Selectivity of Slave Family Group Sales 
  In this section, we derive a heuristic model of slave traders’ decisions to preserve 
family ties in slave sales in order to maximize their profits. This model does not measure 
the social value of preserving slave family ties, or the value to slave families of doing so, 
but rather the value that slave traders reap from selectively deciding to allow family ties 
to be preserved.
2 We do not claim that this model is a complete theory of selectivity or of 
value maximization by slave traders. Instead, we derive conditions under which negative 
selectivity would produce results consistent with the propensities to preserve family ties 
observed in the data, and the results for family group discounts and heights reported in 
Sections 5 and 6, including variation in group family discounts by age.  
  We use cost-benefit analysis to model the trader’s decision to preserve or sever 
family ties at the time of sale. The benefit of preserving family ties in the model reflects 
gains that slave traders could capture from the mutual love and care slave family 
members voluntarily bestowed upon one another.  
                                                 
2 Because the seller makes the ultimate decision, the model is written from the viewpoint of the seller rather 
than the slave.  A more complex model would include bargaining between the owner and the slave, 
allowing the slave’s preferences to influence the seller’s decision.  For example, the slave might have 
reduced the probability of being sold by promising loyal service to his owner or threatening to run away if 
separated from his family. Or the seller and buyer of the slave may simply have been aware that preserving 
family ties would increase loyalty and reduce the risk of flight.   8
We assume that there is a cost to slave traders from preserving family groups, 
which has two parts. First, some or all members of the family group will expend 
resources caring for each other above and beyond what strangers would expend, and this 
expenditure of time and energy may reduce their value to their masters. Second, 
preserving family ties entails a lost option value to the seller from foregone flexibility in 
the market at the time of sale. Most buyers purchased single slaves rather than groups of 
slaves.  Buying a group of slaves (or a family) might have been difficult for some buyers 
facing a credit constraint.  In addition, the labor needs of would-be buyers might not have 
aligned with the age-sex structure of a particular slave family. Thus, preserving slave 
families at the time of sale has an expected cost.  
We assume for simplicity that the sum of incremental resources expended for care 
as the result of family ties, plus lost option value cost, takes the form of a fixed constant 
plus a proportion of the value of the slaves. For a particular family member, the cost of 
allowing that slave to be sold with the family takes the form: 
C = a + m V, 
where C is the total cost from preserving family ties, a and m are positive parameters, and 
V is the stand-alone market value of the slave under consideration. For simplicity, and 
without loss of generality, we assume that this cost function is linear and the same for all 
slaves. 
  We further assume that the gross benefit, B, of preserving family ties is strictly 
positive and decreasing in V. This assumption reflects the fact that higher value slaves 
are also more robust physically, and thus derive less expected benefit from care than   9
slaves with lower market value.
3 We also assume that the benefit of receiving familial 
love and care varies with the age of the slave receiving it. Holding V constant, we assume 
that B is highest for elderly slaves, next highest for children, and lowest for young adults. 
This assumption of a U-shaped age profile for the benefit of preserving family ties 
reflects age-specific variation in the need for care. Thus: 
B =  b – f V + g (A),  
where b and f are positive parameters and A is age. 
  In deciding whether to preserve a family tie in a sale, a slave trader compares the 
benefit and the cost of doing so and decides to preserve the family tie if B>C.  
In order to analyze the properties of this model, we consider four related slaves. 
One is a 36-year-old mother of two sons, aged 12 and 20 years, and she is also the 
daughter of a 55-year-old man. The slave trader must decide which of these four related 
people he will sell separately and which, if any, he will sell in a family group. To 
simplify the exposition, we will analyze three separate decisions by the trader to 
separately sell each male from the family group.   
Assume for simplicity that the market value of slaves sold on a stand-alone basis 
is distributed uniformly over an interval [l, h]. In particular, consider three different value 
intervals, one each for 12-year-old males, 20-year-old males, and 55-year-old males, and 
assume, consistent with the patterns observed in our dataset for slave sales, that the lower 
and upper bounds of these three intervals are defined such that: 
l20    >  l12    >  l55   and 
h20   >  h12   >  h55 . 
                                                 
3 If markets are efficient, the price of a slave should equal the discounted present value of his or her future 
production net of maintenance costs.  An ailing slave has greater need for care (and remaining in the   10
We illustrate the equilibrium decisions made under the above assumptions, for 
each of three individuals, in Figure 1. The curves, B20, B12, and B55, represent the slave 
trader’s gross benefit from selling the slaves aged 20 years, 12 years, and 55 years, 
respectively, with their mother/daughter.  The curves are negatively sloped, indicating 
that increased market value reduces the trader’s benefit from maintaining family ties.  
V12
e is the equilibrium cutoff point for a 12-year-old male. Twelve-year-old males with 
market values greater than V12
e will be sold as stand-alones, while those with values less 
than V12
e will be sold with their families. Assuming the uniform distribution, the 
proportion of 12-year-old males sold on a stand-alone basis, PS12, , is given by:  
PS12  = (h12 - V12
e) /  (h12 - l12) . 
Analogous values of PS20  and  PS55  can also be defined. Under the realistic parameters 
assumed to draw the graph: 
 PS55  <  PS12   <   PS20 . 
In other words, older people are least likely to be sold as stand-alones, and young adults 
are most likely to be sold as stand-alones.  As we show below, family group sales are 
more likely for the old and young rather than slaves in the middle of the age distribution.  
The group-family discount varies across age groups. It can be derived by 
comparing the average value of stand-alones and the average value of slaves sold with 
their families for that age. Note that the value of the 12-year-old male sold with his 
mother as a two-person group would be the stand-alone value of the mother plus the 
stand-alone value of the 12-year-old, plus the value of B for that 12-year-old, less the 
value of C for that 12-year-old. For slaves whose stand-alone values place them to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
family) and has lower standalone market value.     11
right of their respective V
e values, they will be sold as stand-alones. Those to the right of 
V
e will be sold as group members.  
  This model could explain why the proportion of slaves that retain group family 
ties varies by age (in particular, why that proportion is U-shaped in age), and why family 
group discounts also vary by age. The model predicts that the value to slave owners (and, 
therefore, to slave traders) of preserving family ties depends on the value of the slave and 
his or her age. For many slaves (especially young adults of high value) preserving family 
ties will not be sufficiently valued by the market to overcome the cost (the lost option 
value from selling the slave singly); but for other slaves (especially the youngest and 
oldest being sold) preserving family ties will be worth the foregone option value. 
  This model is useful for illustrating three things. First, group discounts can vary 
by age. As depicted in Figure 1, it is easy to construct examples using this model that can 
match the different group discounts observed in our data, which are presented below (that 
is, 70% for older people, 37% for children, and 20% for young adults). Second, it is easy 
to construct examples to match another feature of the data, namely that the proportion of 
slaves in family groups varies greatly by age cohort, with the very old and the very young 
showing the highest proportions in family groups. Third, nothing in the model requires 
the mean market value of slaves sold in family groups to be lower than the population 
mean market value for that cohort. In other words, negative selectivity does not require 
that family members sold in groups have lower value on average than the average value 
of the same cohort in the slave population, only that they have lower average value 
relative to the population of slaves sold as stand-alones. Given that slaves sold on the 
whole were of higher than average value (Pritchett and Chamberlain, 1993), the fact that   12
group members are predicted to be of lower value than stand-alone members does not 
determine whether slaves sold in family groups were of higher or lower average value 
than the corresponding cohort of the slave population. 
We conclude by considering the effects of adding asymmetric information to this 
simple model. Observationally equivalent slaves will command equivalent prices.  If 
slave traders are better informed than buyers regarding the productivity of their slaves, 
they may try to mislead buyers to obtain higher prices for some of their slaves (those that 
cannot be observed to be of low value). Note that there would be no corresponding 
incentive to sell high productivity slaves via group transactions.  Although individual 
slaves might be culled from the owner’s holdings, such adverse selection is unlikely for 
the members of a family group.  Because, in equilibrium, buyers are aware of the 
incentive of sellers to deceive them, stand-alone sales would suffer a lemons premium, 
and observed family group discounts would be lower than in the symmetric-information 
equilibrium (Greenwald and Glasspiegel, 1983).   
 
3. Modeling Slave Prices from New Orleans Sales: Data and Methodology 
  We use the New Orleans Slave Sale Sample, originally collected under the 
direction of Fogel and Engerman (1976), and used previously by Kotlikoff (1979, 1992), 
Greenwald and Glasspiegel (1983), and Freudenberger and Pritchett (1991).  During the 
first part of the nineteenth century, New Orleans was the center of slave trading in the 
South. Transactions included both local slave sales and sales of imported slaves, often 
brought by ship from elsewhere in the South. Because of its French legal tradition, slaves 
in Louisiana were considered real estate rather than personal property, and as such, all   13
slave sales had to be notarized.
4  The Fogel and Engerman sample was drawn from the 
New Orleans Notarial Archives, which was created in 1867 to serve as a depository of the 
notarial records.  These records are not a complete set of transactions – some notarial 
records were destroyed in office fires whereas others appear to have been simply lost.
5 
Depending on the year of sale, between 2.5 and 5 percent of the extant notarial records 
comprise the sample of slave sales recorded by Fogel and Engerman. 
Summary statistics for these data, for both stand-alone and group sales, are 
presented in Table 1. The data contain 2,169 usable observations of stand-alone sales of 
slaves, which we define as transactions in which only one slave was sold. The dataset 
also contains 683 usable group sale transactions. Typically only the price for the entire 
group was recorded for group sales. Recorded characteristics of the individuals in the 
group include their age, sex, and family relationship (although it is possible that family 
relationships were not always noted). Other data fields include information about the 
degree of skin darkness, whether the transaction was for cash or credit, and whether the 
slaves were sold with a guarantee.
6  Prices are normalized, as in Kotlikoff (1979, 1992), 
by dividing the observed price by the average price of a male, aged 21 to 38 years, sold in 
that same year. This procedure avoids the need to control for price changes over time. 
Before discussing our approach to modeling the factors that affected the pricing of 
slave groups, it is useful to review some of the differences between the samples of stand-
                                                 
4 Louisiana Territorial Acts, 1806, section 10, p. 101.  For a few sales, slave titles were transferred under 
the private signatures and witnessed by a judge, rather than recorded by a public notary.  
5 The number of missing sales records is unknown. An alternative source of data on slave sales, which to 
our knowledge has not been fully exploited, is the New Orleans Conveyance Office. For sales made after 
1827, brief transactions summaries are available in the Conveyance Office, and to our knowledge, these 
records appear to be complete.   
6 According to the law, slaves were sold with an implied guarantee against “physical or moral defects,” 
unless the contract specifically limited that guarantee. So-called moral defects included drunkenness or the 
propensity to attempt escape.   14
alone and group transactions, and the frequency of different types of groups, which offer 
important hints about potential selectivity in the determination of whether a slave was 
included in a group or stand-alone transaction, or a particular type of group transaction. 
Most obviously, the age distributions are very different for the stand-alone and 
group samples (Figures 2 and 3). The group sample includes more children, especially 
young ones.  (Children younger than ten represent 3 percent of stand-alones and nearly 
29 percent of group sales.)  Legal restrictions may have reduced the number of children 
under the age of ten years sold without their parent.  Additional legal restrictions applied 
to the sale of weak or sick slaves (who are more frequently elderly) without a family 
member. Consistent with our model of the costs and benefits of preserving family ties in 
slave sales, differences in the age distributions may reflect the market valuation 
consequences of preserving slaves’ familial relationships under particular circumstances.  
Relatively few intact families were sold in New Orleans and most family groups 
were comprised of mothers with children.  For group sales, data on the size distribution 
and compositions of groups sold are presented in Figures 4-6.  Family group members 
accounted for 45 percent of the total number of slaves sold in groups.  Most family group 
members (87 percent) consisted of mothers and their children, and the most common 
family group consisted of a mother with children (90 percent).  Mother-father-child 
groups were rare (only 3.6 percent of the total number of family groups). Other adult 
family affiliations (by which we mean other family groupings in which children age 13 
and younger were not present) took the form of husband-wife pairs and sibling groupings.   
Because we investigate how the size and composition of groups affected prices in 
group transactions, we must begin with a benchmark against which to measure the effects   15
of group size and structure. We construct a model of stand-alone slave sales to serve as 
our benchmark for group sales. The stand-alone model can be used to generate predicted 
values for each group sale by adding together the predicted values of each group member 
to create a composite predicted value for the group.
7 We then define the logarithm of the 
difference of the actual and predicted group price, and construct a model, based on group 
characteristics, to predict group discounts or premia – that is, deviations of actual group 
prices from predicted values based on the stand-alone benchmark.  
First, we estimate a stand-alone model that regresses observed stand-alone prices 
on a variety of slave characteristics. This model is a modification of Kotlikoff’s pricing 
model, which includes the regressors listed in Table 2. The most important difference 
between our stand-alone model and Kotlikoff’s model derive from the fact that we apply 
the Kotlikoff model only to stand-alone transactions. Kotlikoff included mother-child 
transactions in his model (which we will model separately in our group transactions 
analysis). Because we exclude all but stand-alone transactions our model excludes 
regressors that Kotlikoff used to capture special features of mother child transactions. In 
all other respects, however, our model is very close to Kotlikoff’s. We experimented with 
a variety of alternative specifications for the age-sex distribution and found that none of 
them substantially improved the fit of the stand-alone model.
8 In response to a suggestion 
from Stanley Engerman, we added indicator variables that capture whether slave buyers 
                                                 
7 We adjust the predicted values to account for the log normal variance (Greene 1993, p. 299). 
8 One variation slightly improved the adjusted R-squared of the stand-alone model by adding to Kotlikoff’s 
age profile specification (which is a six-degree polynomial in age) additional interaction variables that 
allowed age-sex interactions. The drawback of this innovation is its unrealistic increasing age-sex valuation 
profiles for ages beyond 60, which results from the small number of observations in that age range and the 
limitations of the six-degree polynomial. This interactive model could be useful when truncating the sample 
at age 60, but that would be problematic for our purpose, because some groups include older people. Using 
the interactive age-sex polynomial, the results are very similar to those reported below, with the exception 
of results pertaining to older individuals, who would be excluded from the sample.   16
or slaves were from New Orleans. We found that this addition did improve the fit of both 
the stand-alone and group regression models, but does not affect other results.
9 
Table 2 reports the estimation results for our stand-alone version of the Kotlikoff 
model. The results are familiar. Males are worth more. Light skin adds some market 
value for females, but not for males. Guarantees raise prices. Transactions that involve 
credit require higher prices. The effect of age is estimated by a six-order polynominal, 
which is graphed for males and females separately in Figure 7.  The prices of men and 
women peak in their early 20s, and values drop dramatically in the late 30s and 40s. 
Figure 8 plots the residuals from the stand-alone regression against age. The regression fit 
is similar across different ranges of the age profile.  In particular – and importantly for 
our discussion below of group sales regressions – the regression does not over predict the 
prices of stand-alone children or superannuates. 
 
4. Group Sales Regressions 
  We turn now to the group sales regressions. The dependent variable is the “group 
premium,” defined as the logarithm of the difference between the actual group price and 
the sum of the predicted stand-alone prices for the group members, using the coefficients 
from Table 2 to generate predicted prices for each group member. We investigate the 
effects of several potential influences in producing predictable group premia or discounts. 
                                                 
9 The exclusion of these indicators has no effect on results we report below with respect to group discounts. 
We do not report them in our group price regression tables or discuss them below, but we include them in 
the models we run, since these variables are significant. The coefficients for these variables are interesting: 
New Orleans buyers paid lower prices than non-New Orleans buyers. This pattern may reflect greater 
familiarity with the market by locals, and hence a superior ability to get a good deal. In sales that involved 
both a New Orleans slave and a New Orleans buyer, prices were higher, which may reflect informational 
advantages (the absence of a lemons discount) when buyers have more information about the slave being 
purchased. The impact of transport cost selectivity also is evident in these coefficients: holding all else 
equal, imported slaves commanded higher prices.    17
Table 3 presents our findings. We present Weighted Least Squares results, weighted by 
group size. Larger groups should have smaller group error terms because of the law of 
large numbers. We find, indeed, that larger groups have smaller error terms. We also ran 
regressions using heteroskedasticity correction to control for differences in errors across 
groups, and found very similar results. Also, Ordinary Least Squares regressions (not 
reported here) are qualitatively very similar to the results in Table 3.  
  
4.1 Scale and Group Discounts 
  Fogel and Engerman (1992) hypothesized that the size of the group sold may lead 
to differences in pricing if larger transactions enjoy scale discounts. We investigate this 
hypothesis by dividing our group sample into three groups by size: groups of two people, 
groups of three-five people, and groups of more than five people (finer divisions of the 
sample, or alternative specifications of size effects yield similar results to those reported 
in Table 3 and are not reported here).  
Equation (2) provides the simplest version of a regression testing for scale effects 
in the group premium. Groups of two people are contained in the intercept, and the other 
two categories of group size are captured by adding the estimated intercept to either one 
of two indicator variables (groupsize3_5 and groupsize>5). The three coefficient 
estimates indicate that statistically significant group discounts averaging 7.5% are present 
for groups of two people; for groups of three-five people, discounts average 11.2% and 
are statistically significant, and groups of more than five people display a 3.8% average 
discount, which is not statistically significantly different from zero at the 10%   18
significance level.  Equation (2), therefore, suggests the opposite of a scale discount for 
group sales, since larger groups command a lower discount. 
Once one controls for other groups aspects – specifically, whether groups contain 
family members, and the structure of family and non-family groups – the scale premium 
observed in equation (2) disappears. Equation (3) adds the percentage of group members 
that are related as family members (pc_fam) to the group size indicators, and equations 
(4) and (5) add variables that capture the structure of family and non-family groups.
10 
When these variables are added, the intercept and the two group size indicator variables 
become small and statistically insignificant. In other words, group size, per se, does not 
affect the group premium. The fact that, in equation (2), a group size of two people is 
associated with a significant group discount reflects (among other things) the fact that 
family groups tend to often include only two people (e.g., mother and child). 
 
4.2 Families, Group Structure and Group Discounts 
We construct several variables to capture the structure of groups, each of which is 
defined in percentage terms (capturing a group characteristic, expressed as a percentage 
of group members). This functional form facilitates interpretation of regression 
coefficients. In addition to our family group covariate, pc_fam, which measures the 
percentage of group members related as family, we include other variables to capture the 
structure of groups along other dimensions. Interestingly, we find that the specific 
structure of the family group is crucial for understanding the size of the family discount. 
                                                 
10 Both related and unrelated individuals were sometimes sold together.  Consequently, we indicate the 
presence of related individuals in the group as a percentage of the total group size rather than use a simple 
dummy variable.      19
The proportions of parent-affiliated children in a group of ages 0-10 and 11-13 are 
captured by pc_rel_kids0_10  and  pc_rel_kids11_13, and these variables are included in 
equations (4) and (5). These variables capture the percentage of group members of these 
ages whose mothers or fathers are also group members. The coefficients are large and 
negative, indicating substantial discounts (roughly 40% of the value of an affiliated child 
included in a family group).   This result is consistent with the earlier findings of 
Kotlikoff (1979, p. 513) and Fogel and Engerman (1992, p. 258), which they interpreted 
incorrectly as a scale effect. 
Possibly some sales records do not record all parent-child affiliations. In our 
regression, we include measures of the percentages of unrelated children in the group 
(pc_unrel_kids0-10,  pc_unrel_kids11_13) in order to estimate their effect on the group 
discount.  Suppose that the presence of unrelated children had no effect of the size of the 
group discount (and pc_unrel_kids were zero).  If the effect of pc_rel_kids is negative, 
and if many children that are coded as unaffiliated are really affiliated, that could lead us 
to observe a negative coefficient on pc_unrel_kids (which we would expect to be smaller 
in absolute value than the coefficient on pc_rel_kids). This is precisely what we find in 
equation (4). The coefficient on unaffiliated children ages 0-10 is -0.193; the coefficient 
on unaffiliated children ages 11-13, however, is much smaller (-0.123) than the 
analogous coefficient for related children (-0.452) and is not statistically significant. One 
interpretation of these results is that many of the children under the age of 11 that were 
not recognized in the written record of the transaction as affiliated were in fact affiliated, 
but that this was less likely for children of ages 11-13.   20
Should one interpret discounts associated with children as reflecting childcare 
costs? We believe that would not be a proper interpretation of these coefficients, for three 
reasons. First, observed family discounts were not just on infants or toddlers (those with 
the highest childcare costs), but are present for children ranging up to 13 years of age, 
and these discounts are roughly identical for children of all ages within that range; in fact, 
the estimated coefficients are largest for the 11-13 age range. 
Second, young children sold on a stand-alone basis also required significant 
childcare from someone, and so discounts for childcare costs should have been priced 
into all child sales, irrespective of whether children were sold on a stand-alone basis or 
with a relative. Of course, it is certainly conceivable that mothers would have been 
expected to devote more time to their children than strangers would, but even if mothers 
would have been expected to provide more care to their own children than other 
caregivers would have provided, that difference would not be as relevant for older 
children (say, beyond age 10), and that potential difference cannot plausibly explain the 
large discounts (as a proportion of the value of the child) and the uniform age pattern of 
discounts that are associated with the presence of children in family groups.  
Third, as we explore more fully below, family group sales other than those 
involving parent-children groupings also display large group discounts, which could not 
possibly reflect childcare costs. This suggests a more general explanation for family 
discounts that would apply to discounts associated with children as well as other family 
members. The most obvious explanation, which we confirm with additional evidence 
below, is selectivity bias. Children not sold in family groups (a relatively infrequent 
event) may have been exceptional in their level of physical, emotional, or mental   21
maturity. The relatively exceptional characteristics of stand-alone children could have 
resulted from either positive or negative selectivity. In Section 6, we consider the relative 
merits of the two mechanisms for explaining our results.  
Only 12 groups in our sample contain an affiliated mother, father, and at least one 
child. The presence of such a family grouping within a group is captured by 
pc_momdadchild. The total premium effect for such a group would be measured by 
adding the coefficient on pc_momdadchild (0.13) with the properly weighted value of the 
appropriate coefficient for pc_relkids. For example, a family of three sold together, 
comprised of a father, mother, and a 10-year-old girl, would show the following total 
group premium effect: (0.13) + (0.33)(-0.37). Interestingly, while the pc_momdadchild 
variable by itself is positive, of a reasonably high magnitude, and statistically significant, 
the total group premium effect for a group consisting of a father, mother, and 10-year-old 
girl is essentially zero. We interpret this zero effect as the sum of a negative effect from 
selectivity bias associated with any family group containing children and a positive 
offsetting effect, which could either reflect Fogel and Engerman’s hypothesized value 
creation from preserving the nuclear family or an alternative form of selectivity bias 
attached to momdadchild events. A difference in selectivity strikes us as a real possibility. 
momdadchild groupings are rare events, and may have only occurred under rare 
circumstances different from those giving rise to mother-child sales.  
The prices of older individuals in family groups (pc_rel_old is defined as the 
percentage of individuals in the group who are above the age of 50 and are affiliated with 
someone else in the group) were highly discounted (estimated at 74% of the value of a 
stand-alone older individual per older individual included in the group). This discount is   22
almost twice the proportional discount associated with children. An interpretation of this 
finding is that the value of relatively weak older individuals was especially enhanced by 
being sold in groups, perhaps because these individuals were especially vulnerable to 
injury or infirmity. Interestingly, and consistent with either positive or negative 
selectivity, the coefficient on unaffiliated older people (pc_unrel_old) is small and 
statistically insignificant, indicating that family connections were essential for observing 
discounts on older individuals in groups. 
Other family member discounts (pc_othfam) is a special category of family 
relationships we constructed to capture closely related adults in groups that did not 
include related children (adult siblings or husband-wife pairs). We wanted to explore the 
extent of family discounts in circumstances where family relationships are close, but 
where neither young children nor older people were present. In those cases, the estimated 
coefficient on pc_othfam is still significant and negative (-0.22), but not as large as the 
effects observed for children or older people. We believe that selectivity bias in the sales 
of these closely related adult family members remains a likely explanation of our findings 
– i.e., a married couple, or a sibling pair, were more likely to be sold together if one of 
them was of lower value than the corresponding stand-alone slave sold. 
As a robustness check, because few young children were sold singly, we examine 
the subset of slave groups that consisted entirely of individuals older than ten years of 
age. Specifically, we examine whether (1) there are any discounts associated with scale 
effects, per se, for this subset of group sales and (2) whether family discounts are robust 
to the exclusion of family groups that contained young children. Our findings for this   23




4.3 Transport Costs as a Potential Source of Selectivity Bias 
  Transportation costs could affect group discounts. For example, it might be 
economical to transport an individual as part of a family but not if he were transported by 
himself.   In addition, traders may have more rigorously selected single individuals for 
transport to New Orleans as compared to those slaves who were shipped as part of a 
family.  If this effect were important, then even if the familial care motive modeled in 
Section 2 did not apply, group sales could display discounts relative to stand-alone sales 
for imported slaves but not necessarily for local slaves.  
To investigate the potential for selectivity bias related to transport costs to explain 
the family discounts found in equation (5) of Table 3, we include another specification, 
shown in equation (6) in Table 3. Equation (6) investigates whether observed family 
discounts differ depending on whether the slaves being sold were imported or owned by 
local New Orleans slaveowners. If transport costs, rather than familial care motives, were 
the source of family discounts, then family discounts would be present only for imported 
slaves. Because of sample size limitations, we confine the comparisons between imported 
and local discounts to children as a whole. We find no evidence that transport cost 
                                                 
11 Table A1 of the appendix reports these results. Removing observations for group sales which 
included children aged ten years or less reduces the sample size from 683 to 305 observations. As seen in 
equation (1), the estimated regression coefficient for the percentage of the group who are family members 
(pc_fam) equals -11.6% and is statistically significant.  Husbands and wives, parents with older children, 
and older siblings, when sold together, commanded lower prices than other comparable adults.  When the 
family variable and the group size indicator variables are included in equation (3), the family groups sell at 
discount as indicated by the negative and statistically significant coefficient for pc_fam.  In addition, there 
is no evidence of a group premium or discount for unrelated slaves. 
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selectivity caused family discounts.   Children imported as members of groups do not 
display greater discounts than local children sold as members of groups. In fact, for 
unrelated children sold in groups, estimated discounts are lower for imports than for 
locals, although the difference between locals and imports is not statistically significant.  
 
4.4 Legal Restrictions vs. Family Preferences 
Laws prohibited the division of some family groups into their component parts. 
There were two sets of relevant legal restrictions. First, with respect to children, 
according to the Louisiana Black Code, passed in 1806 and enhanced with stiff penalties 
for violation in 1829, children under the age of ten could not be sold separately from their 
mothers unless they were orphans. Second, with respect to older people, Section 8 of the 
Black Code states that:  “…if at a public sale of slaves, there happen to be some who be 
disabled through old age or otherwise, and who have children, such slaves shall not be 
sold but with such of his children whom he or she may think proper to go with” 
(Louisiana Territorial Acts, 1806, p. 154).  In addition, many states prohibited the 
emancipation of elderly slaves as a means of preventing masters from abandoning older 
slaves that were injured or sick, thus avoiding the public care of elderly slaves as wards 
of the state.
12  
The limitation on the separate sale of children under the age of ten does seem to 
have had an effect on the presence of stand-alone sales of slave children. Table 4 reports 
data on the sales of stand-alone children before and after the imposition of penalties in 
1829 for selling children on a stand-alone basis by falsely identifying them as orphans. It   25
is evident from these data that behavior changed after 1829, and this may be related to the 
new penalties. 
13 Still, legal restrictions cannot explain our results for child-related 
discounts, since those results hold similarly for children aged 11-13. Thus, voluntary 
market decisions not to divide discounted families, rather than legal limitations, per se, 
must be an important factor in explaining our findings.  
The Section 8 limitation on the sale of infirm individuals is itself evidence of the 
probable presence of group selectivity bias. But here, too, it is unlikely that discounts can 
be explained entirely by the law. Infirmity is subject to judgment and it might be quite 
difficult to enforce such a rule in many cases. Furthermore, observed adult-family-
member discounts applied to young adults (pc_othfam), as well as to older adults. 
 
5. Data from Ship Manifests 
  If selectivity bias explains group discounts on slave sales, that implies that the 
characteristics of stand-alone slaves sold have superior value on average to those of 
family-related slaves sold in groups with the same set of characteristics observed in our 
slave sales database. An ideal test of this proposition would require measuring, for stand-
alone and family-affiliated slaves sold in the New Orleans market, relevant observable 
characteristics (i.e., those related to market value) that are not included in the slave sales 
database but that would have been observable to the market.  
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Virginia outlawed the manumission of unsupported slaves aged 45 years and older in 1782. The law was 
upheld in 1824 and 1848 (Savitt 1978, p. 203); Louisiana joined other southern states in outlawing 
manumission in 1857, after a rise in emancipations throughout the 1850s (Schafer 2003, p. 2).  
13 We test this proposition by combining the first two time periods and the last three and performing a 
simple Chi-square test.  Children aged less than 10 years were significantly less likely to be sold separately 
after 1829.  (Chi-square equals 8.67 (1) – significant at 0.003 level.)  For those children aged 10 years or 
more, there was no significant change.  (Chi-square equals 0.908 (1) – significant at .34 level.)  For court 
cases involving the enforcement of the 1829 act, see Schafer (1994, pp. 165-168).     26
Height would be one such measure.  Taller slaves were assessed at higher prices 
(Margo and Steckel, 1982: p. 531). Heights were not recorded in the slave sales database, 
but ship manifests did record heights for slaves that were shipped to the New Orleans 
market by slave traders from other parts of the South. Unfortunately, family affiliations 
were not recorded in the ship manifests. Nevertheless, we have devised a method for 
inferring (probabilistically) whether or not a child listed on a ship manifest was traveling 
with his or her mother on the ship.  
The coastwise manifests were mandated by Congress in an effort to prevent the 
smuggling of foreign slaves into the United States.  The Abolition Act of 1807 provided 
for the coastwise transportation of domestic slaves by requiring duplicate manifests for 
each shipment of slaves.  Each manifest lists slaves by name, along with their age, sex, 
color and stature, and the names and residences of the shippers.  The outward manifest 
was deposited at the port of embarkation, whereas the inward manifest was deposited at 
the port of debarkation.  We use Richard Steckel’s sample of 903 inward coastwise 
manifests for the port of New Orleans.  These manifests list a total of 13,147 slaves.  
The coastwise manifests include the records of slave traders and other shippers to 
New Orleans.  In order to identify the manifests belonging to slave traders, Pritchett and 
Freudenberger (1992: p. 115) compared the names of the shippers listed on the manifests 
with those of people who sold slaves in New Orleans during the same year.  The New 
Orleans Conveyance Office, which was established by state law in 1827, alphabetized the 
names of vendors in the city.   After consulting approximately 80 volumes in the 
Conveyance Office, Pritchett and Freudenberger identified 155 manifests and a total of 
5,303 slaves where the shipper was a New Orleans slave trader.     27
We use the order of the slaves listed on the manifests to identify likely family 
(mother and child) relationships.  By convention, children who were shipped with their 
mothers were listed directly below their mothers on the manifests (Sweig, 1980: p. 8).  
We infer family status by the presence of a female of childbearing age immediately 
followed by a child.  To be specific, we classify all female slaves, aged 15 years or more, 
as potential mothers.  If she is immediately followed on the manifest by a slave who is 15 
to 44 years younger than herself, we identify the slave as her child.  Because some 
mothers were shipped with more than one child, we follow a similar procedure for the 
next slave listed on the manifest – if the immediate preceding slave is identified as having 
a mother, and the slave is between 15 and 44 years younger than the potential mother, we 
identify the slave as her child.  We continue this procedure, allowing for a maximum 
number of eight children being shipped with one particular mother. 
Our sample includes the records of 685 children, aged 4 to 13 years, listed on the 
manifests of identified New Orleans slave traders.  Using the method described 
previously, we estimate that 504 children, or 74 percent of the children shipped by 
traders, were not shipped with their mothers (see Table 5).  The prevalence of these 
unaffiliated children varied by age.  For young children, aged 4 or 5 years, less than 22 
percent were identified as orphans.  For children aged 10 to 13 years, however, over 88 
percent were shipped without their mothers.  Interestingly, a similar pattern is also found 
for the children sold in New Orleans – less than 8 percent of young children, aged 4 or 5 
years, were sold without their mothers.  In contrast, over 75 percent of the children aged 
10 to 13 years were unaffiliated.  For both samples, older children were much more likely   28
to be unaffiliated than the younger children.  The similarity between these two samples 
adds credence to our method for identifying children shipped with their mothers.      
 
6. Heights Regressions Measuring Selectivity Bias 
  In Table 6, we report regression results that compare the heights of children that 
we identify as affiliated with a mother versus those that are not affiliated, controlling for 
age and sex.
14 Equations (1)-(3) report that, on average, children that we identify as 
(likely to have been) shipped with their mothers are roughly 1.6-1.8 inches shorter than 
children of the same sex and age who are unaffiliated. Equations (4)-(6) interact the 
“shipped with mother” effect on height with age indicators for children in three age 
groups:  (1) children aged four to seven year, (2) children aged 8 to 10 years, and (3) 
children aged more than 10 years. We find that for children aged 10 years of less, the 
estimated height shortfall of affiliated children is roughly 2.2 to 1.7 inches. For older 
affiliated children, the estimated height shortfall is sensitive to the inclusion of the 
manifest dummies, and ranges from 0.8 inches (and marginally statistically significant) to 
1.5 inches (and statistically significant).  
  We conclude that the data on children’s heights from the shipping manifests 
support the selectivity-bias hypothesis that children shipped to New Orleans for sale with 
their mothers were significantly different (i.e., shorter, and less valuable) than children 
shipped without their mothers.  The estimated effect is stronger for young children, 
although the difference between younger and older children is not robustly statistically 
                                                 
14 In response to a comment by Howard Bodenhorn, we also considered the potential influence of skin color 
on heights but the results were insignificant.   29
significant. This finding lends support to the selectivity bias hypothesis for explaining the 
observed discounts associated with children in family groups, reported in Table 3. 
  In Table 7, we report additional results including manifests for ships unrelated to 
the slave trade. These data serve two purposes. First, they provide a control group to test 
whether height differences measured in Table 6 between affiliated and unaffiliated 
children being sold can be properly attributed to the effects of selectivity bias in the sale 
of affiliated children sold with their mothers relative to stand-alone slave sales. If the 
same result were observed in manifest data unrelated to the slave trade, then that would 
suggest some other causal factor for this difference unrelated to selectivity bias in slave 
sales. Table 7 shows that the “shipped with mother effect,” per se, is zero. The heights of 
child slaves traveling on non-slave trader ships had similar heights irrespective of 
whether they were traveling with their mothers. In this larger sample, the indicator 
variables associated with slave trader vessels continue to show greater heights for 
children traveling without their mothers, especially for those under the age of 10 years. 
  A second purpose to analyzing height data from manifests unrelated to the slave 
trade is their usefulness for gauging the heights of children in the general population, as a 
point of comparison with the heights of slave children traveling on slave traders’ vessels, 
either traveling separately or with their mothers, en route to the New Orleans slave 
market. Here the key finding is that slave children traveling on slave traders’ ships, 
whether with their mothers or alone, were taller on average than slave children traveling 
on non-slave trader vessels. The magnitudes of the height differences for both child 
groups traveling on slave traders’ vessels are large and statistically significant for slave 
children under the age of 10, although the magnitude of the effect is smaller and not   30
statistically significant for children older than 10 who are traveling on a slave trader’s 
ship with their mothers. We interpret this as evidence in favor of positive selectivity 
related to transportation cost, which caused the heights even of affiliated children en 
route for sale in New Orleans to be greater than the mean of the general population (as 
proxied by the average of children’s heights from the non-slave trader manifests).   
 
7. Conclusion 
The existence of family discounts on the sales of slave families including 
children, when compared to stand-alone sales of slaves, has been known for some time 
(Kotlikoff, 1979). We investigate the determinants of slave family discounts, using Fogel 
and Engerman’s (1976) data from the New Orleans slave market, and consider alternative 
explanations, including scale discounts for group sales, childcare costs, legal restrictions 
on sales, selectivity bias related to transport costs, and selectivity bias that results from 
the intrinsic market value of preserving family ties. Our results indicate that only the last 
of these potential explanations can account for our results. 
We find that slave family discounts occur not only in transactions involving 
children, but also in transactions involving adults. Scale effects for group sales do not 
explain family discounts. Family discounts are not entirely attributable to the presence of 
children. Indeed, the discounts attached to the sales of family-affiliated elderly people are 
nearly twice those attributable to affiliated children. Other non-child, non-elderly 
affiliated family members (married couples without children, and adult siblings) also 
display large family discounts, although those estimated discounts (19-22%) are smaller 
than the discounts observed for children (roughly 37-45%) and the elderly (75%). Only in   31
the case of family sales involving a mother, a father, and at least one child is the family 
discount zero; in this case, the total (zero) effect reflects the sum of a family discount and 
a premium reflecting the presence of both parents and a child in the family group. 
Family discounts are not attributable to childcare costs or legal restrictions on the 
sale of children or the elderly. Neither are they explained by selectivity bias related to 
transport costs, since family discounts are similar for imported and local slaves.  
Our explanation for family discounts, which is developed in detail in Section 2, 
posits that family members were willing to care for each other, and that traders profited 
by bundling some family members together sometimes (in our model, this occurred when 
one of them had a sufficiently low stand-alone value). In our model, the most physically 
robust individuals (and unusually physically, emotionally, and mentally mature children) 
are not as likely to be sold with family members because they are less in need of family 
care. These decisions by slave traders produced selectivity bias when comparing group 
sales to stand-alone sales. The fact that family discounts are attributable to adult sales, as 
well as those involving children, and that they vary in magnitude (highest for the elderly, 
next highest for children, and lowest for young adults) indicates age-specific differences 
in selectivity bias for different age groups. 
Our explanation implies no arbitrage profit from breaking up the family groups 
that were actually sold prior to their sale. We see this as a desirable property of any 
explanation of family group sales. Although few families were sold intact, the fact that 
traders did not always break up discounted family groups suggests some value to traders 
from selectively preserving families.    32
Evidence from the manifests of ships carrying slaves from elsewhere in the South 
to be sold in New Orleans provides direct evidence on the importance of selectivity bias 
for explaining slave family discounts. Children that we identify as (likely to have been) 
shipped with their mothers are roughly 1.6-1.8 inches shorter than children of the same 
sex and age who are unaffiliated. The estimated height shortfall of young mother-
affiliated children is roughly 1.8-2.3 inches, and for older mother-affiliated children, that 
shortfall ranges from 0.8-1.5 inches. These findings support the selectivity-bias 
hypothesis that children shipped for sale with their mothers were significantly different 
(i.e., shorter, and less valuable) than children shipped without their mothers.   
We compare the heights of slave children traveling by ship who were not shipped 
by slave traders to those who were en route to New Orleans to be sold and conclude that 
both children sold as stand-alones and children sold as family group members were taller 
than the general population of slaves.  Consequently, the presence of unusually weak or 
sickly children in family groups was not the sole cause of the observed family discount.  
The empirical literature on slave family discounts began with Fogel and 
Engerman’s (1974a) hypothesis that slave family sales should entail a premium, owing to 
the value of maintaining family ties, which they argued would be reflected in the values 
of slaves to their masters. While our paper does find some limited support for the 
existence of a nuclear family premium from the positive partial price effect of combining 
a mother, father, and child in a family sale, ironically, we think our observations of 
family discounts more generally may provide stronger evidence of a positive price effect 
from preserving family ties. In our view, family discounts reflect the fact that the market 
attaches value to keeping some families together, especially in circumstances where one   33
family member is weak, injured, or infirm. That market decision itself depends on 
preexisting slave family preferences for family ties, which are only selectively permitted 
by the market. If family members did not care about each other, there would be nothing 
to be gained by slave traders or masters in selectively maintaining family attachments. In 
that sense, slave family discounts may have reflected a market decision to occasionally 
support love, in the interest of value maximization. 
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Table 1 
New Orleans Slave Sales, 1820 to 1860 







Relative Price  0.799  0.318 
Male (1=yes, 0=no)  0.470  0.499 
Light-colored female (1=yes, 0=no)  0.133  0.339 
Light-colored male (1=yes, 0=no)  0.100  0.300 
Male sold with guarantee (1=yes, 0=no)  0.377  0.485 
Female sold  with guarantee (1=yes, 0=no)  0.455  0.498 
Months of credit, equals 0 if interest charged  1.803  4.805 
Female with household occupation (1=yes, 0=no)  0.052  0.221 
Male with household occupation (1=yes, 0=no)  0.014  0.119 
Occupation, not artisan or domestic (1=yes, 0=no)  0.010  0.100 
Skilled worker, aged 15 to 25 years (1=yes, 0=no)  0.006  0.074 
Skilled worker, aged 26 to 30 years (1=yes, 0=no)  0.005  0.071 
Skilled worker, aged 31 to 40 years (1=yes, 0=no)  0.003  0.057 
Skilled worker, aged 41 to 60 years (1=yes, 0=no)  0.002  0.048 
Sold in January (1=yes, 0=no)  0.112  0.316 
Sold in February (1=yes, 0=no)  0.096  0.295 
Sold in March (1=yes, 0=no)  0.114  0.318 
Sold in April (1=yes, 0=no)  0.118  0.322 
Sold in May (1=yes, 0=no)  0.116  0.320 
Sold in June (1=yes, 0=no)  0.082  0.274 
Sold in July (1=yes, 0=no)  0.068  0.252 
Sold in August (1=yes, 0=no)  0.058  0.234 
Sold in September (1=yes, 0=no)  0.042  0.201 
Sold in October (1=yes, 0=no)  0.065  0.247 
Sold in November (1=yes, 0=no)  0.061  0.240 
Sold in December (1=yes, 0=no)  0.067  0.251 
Age in years  24.34  10.23 
Buyer from New Orleans (1=yes, 0=no)  0.780  0.414 
Slave from New Orleans (1=yes, 0=no)  0.708  0.455 
Buyer and slave from New Orleans (1=yes, 0=no)  0.580  0.494 
Number of individuals  2169 
Source:  Fogel and Engerman, 1976.   37
 
Table 1 (continued) 
New Orleans Slave Sales, 1820 to 1860 







Percent Group Premium  -0.083  0.301 
Percent family members  0.536  0.481 
Group size, 2 slaves (1=yes, 0=no)  0.552  0.498 
Group size, 3 to 5 slaves (1=yes, 0=no)  0.332  0.471 
Group size, more than 5 slaves (1=yes, 0=no)  0.116  0.320 
Percent family children, aged 0 to 10 years  0.259  0.277 
Percent family children, aged 11 to 13 years  0.017  0.079 
Percent unrelated children, aged 0 to 10 years  0.031  0.143 
Percent unrelated children, aged 11 to 13 years  0.035  0.136 
Percent local family children, aged 0 to 13 years  0.228  0.279 
Percent imported family children, aged 0 to 13 
years 
0.049 0.155 
Percent local unrelated children, aged 0 to 13 years  0.035  0.158 
Percent imported unrelated children, aged 0 to 13 
years 
0.031 0.141 
Percent Nuclear Family: Mother, father, & child  0.020  0.138 
Percent Other Family: Adult siblings or childless 
couples  
0.029 0.164 
Percent family adults, aged more than 50 years  0.003  0.045 
Percent unrelated adults, aged more than 50 years  0.003  0.029 
Buyer from New Orleans (1=yes, 0=no)  0.662  0.473 
Percent of slaves from New Orleans   0.654  0.475 
Buyer and slaves from New Orleans   0.508  0.500 
Number of groups  683 
Number of individuals  2413 
Source:  Fogel and Engerman, 1976.   38
 
Table 2 
Slave Price Structure Regression Coefficients, Individual Sales 







Male (1=yes, 0=no)  0.143* 
(0.037) 
Light-colored female (1=yes, 0=no)  0.047* 
(0.023) 
Light-colored male (1=yes, 0=no)  0.025 
(0.026) 
Male sold with guarantee (1=yes, 0=no)  0.301* 
(0.027) 
Female sold  with guarantee (1=yes, 0=no)  0.297* 
(0.029) 
Months of credit extended, equals 0 if interest charged  0.015* 
(0.002) 
Female with household occupation (1=yes, 0=no)  0.042 
(0.034) 
Male with household occupation (1=yes, 0=no)  0.011 
(0.061) 




Skilled worker, aged 15 to 25 years (1=yes, 0=no)  0.220* 
(0.097) 
Skilled worker, aged 26 to 30 years (1=yes, 0=no)  0.305* 
(0.102) 
Skilled worker, aged 31 to 40 years (1=yes, 0=no)  0.535* 
(0.128) 
Skilled worker, aged 41 to 60 years (1=yes, 0=no)  0.441* 
(0.153) 
Sold in January (1=yes, 0=no)  0.119* 
(0.041) 
Sold in February (1=yes, 0=no)  0.053 
(0.042) 
Sold in March (1=yes, 0=no)  0.082* 
(0.041) 
Sold in April (1=yes, 0=no)  0.100* 
(0.041) 
Sold in May (1=yes, 0=no)  0.035 
(0.041) 
Sold in June (1=yes, 0=no)  0.019 
(0.043)   39
 
Table 2 (continued) 
Slave Price Structure Regression Coefficients, Individual Sales 





Sold in July (1=yes, 0=no)  0.026 
(0.044) 
Sold in August (1=yes, 0=no)  0.080* 
(0.046) 
Sold in October (1=yes, 0=no)  0.063 
(0.045) 
Sold in November (1=yes, 0=no)  0.076* 
(0.045) 
Sold in December (1=yes, 0=no)  0.110* 
(0.045) 






















-6  -0.00015 
(0.00037) 
Buyer from New Orleans (1=yes, 0=no)  -0.108* 
(0.029) 
Slave from New Orleans (1=yes, 0=no)  -0.050 
(0.031) 




Number of observations  2169 
Source:  Fogel and Engerman, 1976. 
Note:  The dependent variable is the logarithm of the slave’s price relative to the average 
annual price of a male slave, aged 21 to 38 years.  Sample includes New Orleans slaves 
sold singly.  The omitted variable refers to unguaranteed dark-colored females, without a 
reported skill, sold for cash in September.   
* indicates the regression coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10 percent 
level.  Standard errors are listed in parentheses.     40
 
Table 3 
Percent Group Premium, Weighted Least Squares Regression Coefficients 










































Group size, more than 5 












Percent family children,  
aged 0 to 10 years 






Percent family children,  
aged 11 to 13 years 






Percent unrelated children, 
aged 0 to 10 years 






Percent unrelated children, 
aged 11 to 13 years 






Percent Nuclear Family: 
Mother, father, & child 







Percent Other Family: 
Adult siblings or married 
couples without children  







Percent family adults, 
aged more than 50 years 





Percent unrelated adults, 
aged more than 50 years 





Percent local family 
children, aged 0 to 13 years 
      -0.386* 
(0.124) 
pc_rel_import0_13 
Percent imported family 
children, aged 0 to 13 years 
      -0.396* 
(0.141)   41
pc_unrel_local0_13 
Percent local unrelated 
children, aged 0 to 13 years 
      -0.213* 
(0.081) 
pc_unrel_importl0_13 
Percent imported unrelated 
children, aged 0 to 13 years 
      -0.089 
(0.093) 
Adjusted R
2  0.048 0.007 0.048 0.082 0.088 0.089 
Number  of  groups  683 683 683 683 683 683 
Source:  Fogel and Engerman, 1976. 
Note:  The dependent variable equals the logarithm of the quotient of the actual and 
predicted group price, where the predicted group price equals the sum of the predicted 
prices for group members, derived from Table 2.  Predicted prices are adjusted for the 
logarithm of the standard error.  Observations are weighted by group size. The omitted 
variable represents a group size of two slaves.  The sample includes group sales (of more 
than one slave), excluding groups with a missing value for the age of an individual.  
Standard errors listed in parentheses.  * indicates that the regression coefficient is 
statistically different from zero at the 10 percent level.     42
Table 4 
Effect of 1829 Black Code Penalties on Frequency of Children Sold on Stand-Alone 
Basis as “Orphans” 
  
The sale of orphans in New Orleans, 1810 to 1859 
Time Period  Slaves under 10 years of age 
sold separately as percentage 
of slaves sold with mother and 
those sold without mothers 
Slaves 10 to 12 years of age 
sold separately as percentage 
of slaves sold with mother and 
those sold without mothers 
1810 – 1819  40.7  66.7 
1820 – 1829  19.6  70.4 
1830 – 1839  12.8  66.7 
1840 – 1849  11.0  73.8 
1850 – 1859  10  59.2 
Source:  Fogel and Engerman (1976). 
Note: The Fogel and Engerman sample includes the records of 1145 children, 0 to 12 
years of age (aged under 13 years).  We can classify these children three ways: (1) 225 
children sold singly, (2) 721 children sold with their mothers, and (3) 199 children sold in 
a group but without an identified mother.  For this latter group, 126 children were not 
sold with a woman, aged 15 years or more – in other words, without a potential mother.  
In addition, two more children were classified as orphans. We assume that these 128 
children were not sold with their mothers, leaving 71 children who might have been sold 
with their mother.  We assume that these 71 children were sold with their mothers. 
   43
Table 5 
Children, Aged 4 to 13 Years, Shipped by Traders 
Descriptive Statistics: Means and Standard Deviations 
 











































































Number of children  685  181  504 
Source:  Inward coastwise manifests, New Orleans, LA 
Note:  Sample includes 120 manifests of slave traders identified from the New Orleans Conveyance 
Records.  For the identification of children sold with mothers, see the text.  Standard deviations are listed in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6  
Heights of Children, Aged 4 to 13 Years, Shipped by New Orleans Slave Traders 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression Results 













































































































































_____ _____ _____ 
Shipped with mother and 
aged 4 to 7 years  
(1=yes, 0=no) 






Shipped with mother and 
aged 8 to 10 years 
(1=yes, 0=no) 






Shipped with mother and 
older than 10 years 
(1=yes, 0=no) 






Interacts age dummies 
with male dummy 
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Includes 119 manifest 
dummies 
No No Yes No No Yes 
Number of children  685  685  685  685  685  685 
Adjusted R
2  0.733 0.733 0.815 0.733 0.733 0.815 
Source:  Inward coastwise manifests, New Orleans, LA 
Note:  The dependent variable is the height of slaves in inches.  The omitted variable represents a female 
slave, aged four years, shipped without her mother.  Sample includes 120 manifests of slave traders 
identified from the New Orleans Conveyance Records.  For the identification of children sold with mothers, 
see the text.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates the covariate is significantly different from 
zero at the 10 percent level.     45
Table 7 
Heights of Children, Aged 4 to 13 Years, Shipped by Traders and Non-Traders 
Regression Results 










































































































Shipped by slave trader, without mother, and 
younger than 10 year (1=yes, 0=no) 




Shipped by slave trader, without mother, and 
older than 10 year (1=yes, 0=no) 











Shipped by slave trader, with mother and 
younger than 10 year (1=yes, 0=no) 




Shipped by slave trader, with mother and older 
than 10 year (1=yes, 0=no) 




Interacts age dummies with male dummy  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Number  of  children  1084 1084 1084 1084 
Adjusted R
2  0.703 0.707 0.705 0.708 
Source:  Inward coastwise manifests, New Orleans, LA 
Note:  The dependent variable is the height of slaves in inches.  The omitted variable represents a female 
slave, aged four years, shipped without her mother by someone other than a slave trader.  Sample includes 
274 manifests, slave traders identified from the New Orleans Conveyance Records.  For the identification 
of children sold with mothers, see the text.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * indicates the covariate is 
significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level.   
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Figure 1:  Age, Market Value, and the Decision to 
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            Figure 8 
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Appendix: 
Table A1 
Percent Group Premium, Childless Groups 
Weighted Least Squares Regression Coefficients 
Covariate (1)  (2)  (3)  Mean  & 





































2  0.014 -0.003 0.009 
 
 
Number of groups  305  305  305  305 
Number of slaves  1039  1039  1039  1039 
Source:  Fogel and Engerman, 1976. 
Note:  The dependent variable equals the logarithm of the quotient of the actual and 
predicted group price, where the predicted group price equals the sum of the predicted 
prices for group members, derived from Table 2.  Predicted prices are adjusted for the 
logarithm of the standard error.  Observations are weighted by group size. The omitted 
variable represents a group size of two slaves.  The sample includes group sales (of more 
than one slave), excluding groups with a missing value for the age of an individual and 
those including children aged less than 10 years.  Standard errors listed in parentheses.   
* indicates that the regression coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 10 
percent level.   
 